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Plaintiffs who prevail in lawsuits claiming deprivation of civil
rights are generally entitled to receive, in addition to relief for their
actual injuries, an award of "reasonable" attorney's fees under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (Fees Act or Act)' or
a similar fee-shifting statute. 2 The United States Supreme Court re-
cently ruled in Evans v. Jeff D. , however, that settlement offers by
defendants in such cases may be conditioned on plaintiffs' complete
or partial waiver of attorney's fees, without violating the language or
intent of the Fees Act.
The Supreme Court's pronouncement on this issue did not, how-
ever, resolve all controversy surrounding fee waivers. BeforeJeff D.,
several bar association ethics committees had opined that these con-
ditional settlement offers4 were unethical because they created a se-
vere conflict of interest for plaintiffs' attorneys. 5 Civil rights
organizations and other groups are currently attempting to obtain
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
2. There are now more than 150 federal statutes which provide for awards of attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in some circumstances. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
3. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
4. The terms "conditional settlement offer," "simultaneous negotiation," and "fee
limitations or waivers" refer to settlement negotiations in civil rights cases in which a
defendant conditions settlement on a waiver of, or limitation on, the plaintiff's statutory
right to receive attorney's fees. These terms also include so-called "lump-sum" settle-
ment offers which explicitly provide that the settling defendant will not be liable for any
additional attorney's fees beyond the offered amount, thus forcing the plaintiff's attor-
ney to look to the plaintiff's recovery as the sole source of his or her fee.
5. These ethics opinions are cited at note 24, infa. For an explanation of the conflict
of interest created by these offers, see infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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additional rulings to this effect.6 After describing the background
and history of the Fees Act, this Current Topic will consider the
ethical problems raised by conditional settlement offers, and will ar-
gue that such offers are not unethical. Moreover, the article will
demonstrate that current ethics codes obligate plaintiffs' attorneys
to negotiate fees and merits simultaneously once the issue of fees
has been raised by defendants, and that defense counsels' duties to
their clients obligate them to inject this issue into settlement negoti-
ations. The Current Topic will conclude with an analysis of the
likely impact on civil rights enforcement of permitting simultaneous
negotiation of fees and merits.
I. Background
Historically, state and federal courts in this country have followed
the "American Rule" for the allocation of litigation costs, which re-
quires each party to pay his or her own attorney's fees regardless of
the outcome of the litigation. 7 With limited exceptions, therefore,
the federal courts have declined to award attorney's fees to prevail-
ing parties without specific statutory authority.8 For a brief period
in the early 1970's, some federal courts began making fee awards to
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights and other "public interest" cases
under the "private attorney general" theory. 9 This practice was ab-
ruptly halted by the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co.
v. Wilderness Society,10 which held that federal courts have no power
to abrogate the American Rule.
6. See, e.g., Memorandum from E. Richard Larson, ACLU National Staff Counsel, to
ACLU Affiliate Directors and Lawyers 8 (July 24, 1986) [hereinafter ACLU Memoran-
dum] (on file with Yale Law & Policy Review). Civil rights defendants are also active in
this area. For example, in 1985 the Justice Department asked the District of Columbia
Bar Association to reconsider its previous ethics opinion holding fee waivers unethical.
See Letter from D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy Attorney General, to Charles E. Buffon, D.C.
Bar Association (July 16, 1985) (on file with Yale Law & Policy Review). The Justice
Department recently renewed this request in light of theJeffD ruling. See Letter from
Arnold I. Burns, Associate Attorney General, to Charles E. Buffon (July 1, 1986) (on file
with Yale Law & Policy Review).
7. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The
United States stands virtually alone among Western nations in this regard. Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 797 (1966).
8. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-59 (discussing exceptions for willful disregard of court
orders, bad faith, and "common fund" cases).
9. Id. at 270 n.46, and cases there cited. The "private attorney general" theory pro-
vided for awards of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs whose successes vindicated
important public policies and assisted the continued proper functioning of government.
Id. at 245-46.




In direct response to Alyeska, Congress enacted the Fees Act,''
which provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a pro-
vision of [the Civil Rights Acts], the court, in its discretion, may al-
low the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs."' 2 The legislative history of the
Act evinces Congress' intent that the law be construed liberally so as
to encourage meritorious lawsuits to redress the deprivation of civil
rights. The courts have complied with this congressional mandate
in several ways. For example, the Fees Act has been construed to
allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees in almost all civil
rights cases as a matter of course,' 3 even if the plaintiffs are only
partially successful in their suits, 14 and even if they settle before
trial.1 5 Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, are rarely entitled
to receive attorney's fees, on the theory that such awards against
plaintiffs would chill civil rights enforcement by private parties.' 6
As an additional incentive to litigate civil rights cases, courts award
fees based on the prevailing market rate for similar legal services,
rather than the actual cost of providing civil rights representation.' 7
When the issue of conditional settlement first arose, therefore,
some courts were reluctant to allow limits on plaintiffs' ability to
recover the full amount of statutory fees provided by the Fees Act.
Any such limitation, it was believed, would compromise Congress'
intent to spur civil rights litigation. Moreover, courts were con-
cerned by the conflict of interest inherent in simultaneous negotia-
11. Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988); see also S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5908, 5908 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1011 l (legislative history indicating Congress'
express intent to overrule Alyeska); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1976)
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1558] (same).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
13. Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1980);
Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979).
14. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1983). Furthermore, the fee award
need not be proportionate to the relief obtained. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, - U.S.
-, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
15. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
16. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980).
17. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984). Fee awards are computed by
multiplying the hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate to obtain the so-
called "lodestar" amount. This amount may then be increased or decreased to reflect
certain factors, such as the risk of not prevailing (and therefore of not recovering any
attorney's fees), id. at 902 (Brennan,J., concurring), and the degree of success obtained,
see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-37 (1983). A reasonable hourly rate is one
which is reasonable given the type and complexity of the legal issues involved, the expe-
rience and ability of the attorney, the quality of the attorney's work, and prevailing
hourly rates for similar services in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at
894-900 & n. 11.
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tion by plaintiffs' attorneys of their fees' 8 and their clients' relief.
The conflict lies in the existence of a necessary tradeoff between the
amounts allocated to the attorney's fee and to the plaintiff as dam-
ages or other relief, the attorney thus has a financial interest in max-
imizing his or her own fee at the expense of the client. In Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 1 the seminal case in this area prior to Jeff D., the
Third Circuit held that plaintiffs' attorneys would not be permitted
to negotiate fees and merits simultaneously. Other courts relied on
Prandini in prohibiting defense counsel from injecting the issue of
fees into settlement negotiations, on the grounds that simultaneous
negotiation would be irremediably tainted by plaintiffs' attorneys'
conflicts of interest, 20 and that such settlements would in any case
be contrary to the policy and purpose of the Fees Act, since they
would discourage attorneys from bringing civil rights actions by les-
sening the chances that the attorneys would receive their fees. 2'
The Supreme Court's decision inJeffD. effectively overruled these
cases by approving fee waivers and simultaneous negotiation of fees
18. Although it is now settled that the right to an award of attorney's fees belongs to
the party, and not to the attorney, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, in practice
attorney's fees are generally awarded directly to the attorney. See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122, 126 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978); Plant v. Blazer Fin.
Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1365-66 (5th Cir. 1979).
19. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
20. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Pekarsky v. Ariyoshi, 575 F. Supp. 673, 675 (D. Hawaii
1983); Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978); Regalado v.
Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also Obin v. District No. 9 of Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1981) (dic-
tum); cf. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 n.71 (5th Cir.
1978) (because of the inherent conflict of interest, simultaneous negotiation "would
weigh heavily against the district court's decision to accept the settlement"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
21. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd- U.S.-,
106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986); Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724, 725-26 (N.D. Ind. 1983); c.
Lazar v. Pierce, 757 F.2d 435, 438 (1st Cir. 1985) (fee waiver upheld on facts, but court
stated that counsel have a right to insist on a reasonable fee, even if that puts the settle-
ment agreement at risk); Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
970 (1982) (contract limiting state's liability for attorney's fees to legal services organi-
zation held void as against policy of Fees Act).
Other courts rejected Pandini, and instead permitted presettlement fee negotiation or
fee waivers in at least some circumstances. See, e.g., Moore v. National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir 1985) (fee waiver proposed by plaintiff);
Brown v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1983)
(fee waiver); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1214 (5th Cir. Unit A), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 828 (1982) (lump sum settlement award which included attorney's fees); White v.
New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) (dictum)
(simultaneous negotiation), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Chicano Police
Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 132 (10th Cir. 1980) (fee waiver); Rice v. Gates




and merits in civil rights cases. 22 However, the Court's decision of
the legal question does not in itself resolve the ethical dilemma
presented by these types of settlement offers. 23 It is therefore nec-
essary to reevaluate the ethical issues and applicable ethics commit-
tee opinions in light of theJeffD. holding.
II. The Ethics of Simultaneous Negotiation of Fees and Merits
At least five state and local bar associations have ruled that de-
fense attorneys' requests for fee waivers or limitations are unethical
in some or all situations,2 4 and commentators have supported their
interpretation of the ethics codes. 25 The critics of conditional settle-
22. JeffD. involved a civil rights class action for injunctive relief, precisely the type of
case in which the conflict of interest is most intense, see Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57 (1975), and the
injury to plaintiffs' attorneys most severe. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
Thus, Jeff D.'s holding forecloses further legal challenges to fee waivers in civil rights
cases, except in certain limited cases. See infra note 86.
23. Although the majority opinion inJeffD. discussed and dismissed the ethical con-
cerns raised by conditional settlement offers, 106 S. Ct. at 1537-38, it is clear that the
states have plenary power over matters of legal ethics and attorney discipline, except
where directly preempted by federal law. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422
(1978); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 & n.2 (1963); see also United States v.
Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986) (U.S. Attorneys subject to state bar rules of
ethics). IndeedJustice Brennan's dissent inJeffD. stated that "[t]he Court's decision in
no way limits the power of state and local bar associations to regulate the ethical conduct
of lawyers," and encouraged ethics committees to consider ruling unethical defense
counsel requests for fee waivers. 106 S. Ct. at 1557; see also id. at 1557 n.20 (ethics
concerns related to Fees Act are "purely a matter of local law"); Moore v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d at 1112 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment) ("indeed the
ruling of the local bar ethics committee practically settles the question of whether" de-
fendants may request fee waivers); id. at 1114 n.1 (Wright, J., dissenting).
24. See Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Inc., Op. 85-74 (April
17, 1985) [hereinafter Maryland Bar Opinion] (attorney may not settle civil rights action
by agreeing to waive or limit his statutory fees); Committee on Legal Ethics of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Bar, Op. 147 (Jan. 22, 1985) [hereinafter D.C. Bar Opinion] (fee waiv-
ers or limitations unethical; lump sum settlement offers permissible); Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Ass'n, Op. 82-80 (1985) (reaf-
firming Op. 80-94, below); Grievance Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar of
Maine, Op. 17 Uan. 15, 1981); Committee on Professional andJudicial Ethics of the New
York City Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-94 (1981) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Bar Opinion] (fee waivers or
limitations unethical); Committee on Professional Ethics, Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Infor-
mal Op. 85-19 (Nov. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Connecticut Bar Opinion] (fee waivers un-
ethical in some situations). But see State Bar of New Mexico Advisory Opinions Comm.,
Op. 1985-3 (May 14, 1985) (lump sum offers permissible; fee waivers not per se unethi-
cal); State Disciplinary Bd. of the State Bar of Georgia, Advisory Op. 39 (July 20, 1984)
(lump sum offers permissible); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op.
536 (Dec. 7, 1983) (simultaneous negotiation permissible with consent of plaintiff).
Although the majority opinion in Jeff D. dismissed these rulings as "bottomed ulti-
mately on § 1988," 106 S. Ct. at 1538 n.15, this is not accurate. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 32-56. Thus,JeffD. did not resolve the ethics issue.
25. See, e.g., Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the ll'aiver of Attorney 's Fees by
Civil Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attor-
ney s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REV. 597, 626-33 (1984); see also Levin, Practical,
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ments rely on four main arguments: first, that requests for fee waiv-
ers frustrate the policy of the Fees Act and violate defense attorneys'
obligations to support legal services for the poor, and thus are prej-
udicial to the administration of justice; second, that such requests
create and exploit a conflict of interest for plaintiffs' counsel, and
are therefore per se unethical; third, that these settlement offers vio-
late the heightened obligations of government counsel to achieve
just results in litigation; and fourth, that demands for fee waivers
violate the public's right to counsel and plaintiffs' attorneys' rights
to practice by eliminating attorneys' opportunities to obtain a rea-
sonable fee for representing indigent plaintiffs. Application of the
standards of attorney conduct to these four arguments reveals, how-
ever, that requests for fee. waivers or limitations on fee awards are
not unethical. This result is the same under both the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code)26 and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Rules), 27 which together govern the behavior of at-
torneys in virtually all American jurisdictions.
28
Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of Cases in Which Statutory Attorney's
Fees Are Authorized, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515, 520 (1980) (fee waiver requests proba-
bly unethical). But see Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of Attorneys' Fees:
Policy, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806, 810-12 (1983) (re-
jecting argument that fee waivers are unethical as conduct prejudicial to administration
of justice).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter CODE]. The
Code consists of canons, disciplinary rules (DRs), and ethical considerations (ECs). The
canons are "statements of axiomatic norms," and are essentially titles for each section of
the Code. See CODE, Preamble and Preliminary Statement. The DRs are mandatory
rules of conduct, and "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id. The ECs are not mandatory;
rather, they "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." Id.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter RULES]. The Rules
consist of numbered Rules and accompanying Comments. Those Rules that use the
terms "shall" or "shall not" are mandatory; violation of these commands may result in
disciplinary action. See RULES, Scope. Other Rules, which use the term "may," are per-
missive and discretionary. Id. The Comments "do not add obligations to the Rules but
provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." Id.
28. Fourteen states (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and
Washington) have adopted the Rules, often with minor modification. ABA/BNA LAW-
YERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:3 (1986) [hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL].
North Carolina has adopted a combination of the Rules and the Code. Id. The remain-
ing states, except for Maine and Mississippi, currently operate under the Code, again
with some modifications. See Developments iii the Law - Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (1981) [hereinafter Developments - Conflicts]. Most
federal courts have also adopted one or the other of the ABA codes. See id. ; see also Nix v.
Whiteside, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (applying Code and Rules to determination
of ethical obligations of criminal defense lawyer whose client intends to commit per-
jury). Although most state bar associations have the power to enforce the rules of ethics
through the issuance of ethics opinions and disciplinary sanctions, Developments - Con-
flicts, supra, at 1250, courts also possess the inherent power to regulate and discipline
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A. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
Both the Code and the Rules (hereinafter sometimes collectively
referred to as "ethics codes") provide that "a lawyer shall not ...
[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjus-
tice." 29 Before the Supreme Court's decision in Jeff D., it was ar-
gued that conditional settlement offers violated this provision by
frustrating the policy of the Fees Act, since preventing plaintiffs' at-
torneys from earning the fees due them under the Act would reduce
the available pool of attorneys willing to handle civil rights cases.30
However, Jeff D.'s contrary holding silences the opposition to fee
waivers on these grounds, since the Court explicitly found that these
waivers do not violate either the letter or spirit of the Act. 3'
A related argument against conditional settlement offers is that
they violate defense attorneys' ethical obligations to further the ad-
ministration of justice by "support[ing] all proper efforts to meet
[the] need for legal services," 32 and generally by promoting equal
access to the courts for all litigants. However, this argument mis-
construes the purpose and extent of the ethics codes' support forpro
bono service. Each lawyer is encouraged to participate personally in
providing legal services to those unable to afford them. 33 It is im-
possible to support an interpretation of these ethics code provisions
which would require a defense attorney to prejudice the interests of
her own client, in the course of her representation of that client,
merely in order to provide some possible benefit to a plaintiff's at-
attorneys who appear before them. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir.
1976).
29. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 8.4(d); CODE, supra note 26, DR 1-102(A)(5).
30. See Kraus, supra note 25, at 632-33; Comment, supra note 25, at 815-16; see also
D.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24, at 6 (routine demands for fee waivers "could seriously
undermine the effectiveness of [the Fees Act] as a device for making counsel available");
Maryland Bar Opinion, supra note 24; N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24.
31. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. at 1542-43. Since the Supreme Court has final
power to decide questions of federal law, ethics committees are bound by its interpreta-
tion of the language and intent of the Fees Act.
32. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 6.1 comment; CODE, supra note 26, EC 2-25; see also id.
EC 2-1 (attorneys should "assist in making legal services fully available"), EC 2-16, EC
8-3 ("fair administration ofjustice requires the availability of competent lawyers"). Note
that the provisions encouraging support for legal services are not mandatory under
either the Rules or the Code, and thus do not support disciplinary sanctions or provide
mandatory rules of behavior.
33. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 6.1 comment ("The basic responsibility for providing
legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer....
Every lawyer.., should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of
legal services to the disadvantaged"); CODE, supra note 26, EC 2-25 (to the same effect);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 legal background (Proposed
Final Draft 1981) (referring to the traditional "individual obligation to provide legal
services").
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torney who happens to be fulfilling his legal services duty. 34 The
need for legal services for the poor does not override lawyers' tradi-
tional ethical obligations to their clients.
Moreover, it is difficult to demonstrate that a settlement offer con-
ditioned on a fee limitation or fee waiver actually has any direct im-
pact on "the administration of justice" or the supply of legal
services to indigents with meritorious cases. Both the Supreme
Court and legal scholars have argued that allowing such offers may
actually permit more efficient and just resolution of cases by encour-
aging settlements. 35 There is no empirical evidence to support the
proposition that fee waivers discourage the bringing of civil rights
actions; those jurisdictions that forbade such offers prior to JeffD.
did not experience a more rapid increase in filings of civil rights
actions than did jurisdictions which permitted such offers. 36 In sum,
34. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.7; CODE, supra note 26, DR 7-101 (A)(l), (3), EC
5-1, EC 5-21, EC 7-1; see also Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the
Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 772 (1975) ("The notion that a private attorney owes
a duty to the public which overrides his duty to his client is alien to the traditions and
ethical standards of the legal profession"). At most, the defendant's attorney may be
entitled (but not obligated) to explain the situation to his or her client, and determine if
the client is willing to forego making a conditional settlement offer in the interests of
justice. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 2.1 & comment; CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-8, EC
7-9; see also infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
35. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. at 1540-42; Comment, supra note 25, at 811.
Permitting simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits makes defendants more willing
to settle, since only in this way can they know their total exposure. Marek v. Chesny, -
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3016 (1985). Defendants will be much less willing to settle on
the merits if they thereby open themselves to liability for an undetermined amount of
attorney's fees, very often the single most costly element of the settlement award. See
infra note 81 and accompanying text.
36. For example, the Tenth Circuit began permitting simultaneous negotiation in
1980. Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980). From
1980 to 1986, filings of civil rights cases in district courts in the Tenth Circuit increased
by 98.5%; civil rights cases represented 13.1% of all private civil cases filed in 1986, up
from 12.0% in 1980. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C3 (1981) [hereinafter 1980 ANNUAL REPORT]
(Annual Report data are for twelve-month period ending June 30); ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C3
(published edition not available at press time; pre-publication copy on file with Yale Law
& Policy Review) [hereinafter 1986 ANNUAL REPORT]. The First Circuit also approved
the practice of simultaneous negotiation in 1980. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 705 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445
(1982). Between 1980 and 1986, filings of civil rights cases in that circuit increased
54.7%, and civil rights cases as a percentage of all private civil cases increased substan-
tially, from 10.0% to 14.4%. See 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, spra, Table C3; 1986 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra, Table C3.
In contrast, jurisdictions forbidding simultaneous negotiation generally saw less
growth in filings of civil rights cases. Thus, in the Third Circuit (which banned simulta-
neous negotiation in 1977, in Prandini), although filings of civil rights cases increased
58.7% over the entire 1977-86 period, civil rights cases as a percentage of all civil cases
filed actuallyfell from 10.1% to 9.0%. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C3 (1978); 1986 ANNUAL
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requests for fee limits or waivers cannot be said to prejudice the
administration of justice.
B. Creation of the Conflict of Interest
A second objection to conditional settlement offers is that they
create and exploit a conflict of interest for plaintiffs' counsel. That
such offers create a conflict of interest for plaintiffs' attorneys can-
not be denied. When a defendant's offer of conditional settlement
includes, in addition to a request for a fee waiver, a proposed reso-
lution of the merits of the plaintiff's claim that is at least as benefi-
cial as the plaintiff could reasonably expect to obtain at trial, settling
is obviously in the plaintiff's best interests. Just as obviously, how-
ever, settling on these terms is not in the best interests of the plain-
tiff's attorney, who is being asked to forego all or part of the fee he
or she would normally receive. Since most plaintiffs in civil rights
cases are indigent or nearly so, the statutory fee award is often the
attorney's only source of payment.
3 7
JeffD. provides no guidance on this question. The majority opin-
ion dismissed the conflict of interest objection with the observation
that a plaintiff's attorney has no ethical dilemma when presented with
a favorable settlement offer that includes a fee waiver: the lawyer's
sole "ethical duty [is] to serve his clients loyally and competently,"
even to the detriment of his own interests.3 8 This observation, while
correct, does not answer the concern advanced by two bar associa-
REPORT, supra, Table C3. Likewise, although the New York City Bar Association banned
fee waivers and limitations in 1980, see N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24, civil rights
filings in the Southern District of New York increased only 34.4% from 1980 to 1986,
and civil rights cases as a percentage of all civil cases actually dropped slightly, from
6.0% to 5.7%. See 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, Table C3; 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supIa,
Table C3. Finally, the Ninth Circuit strongly discouraged simultaneous negotiation in
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1980), yet civil rights filings increased
only 35.1% over the 1980-86 period, and civil rights cases as a percentage of all civil
cases declined sharply from 12.8% in 1980 to only 9.4% in 1986. See 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT, sapra, Table C3; 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, Table C3. Obviously, factors
other than a jurisdiction's rule regarding fee waivers bear heavily on the number of civil
rights cases filed in a given year, but the available statistical data do nothing to support
the argument that permitting fee waivers will chill civil rights enforcement. If anything,
the evidence seems to point to the opposite conclusion.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11,at 1; S. REP. No. 101l,supra note ll,at2,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5908; see also Legal Services Corpo-
ration Act §§ 1002(3), 1003(a), 1006(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996a(3), 2996b(a), 2996e(a)
(Supp. III 1985) (federally funded legal aid societies may not represent clients capable
of paying legal fees); cf. ACLU Memorandum, supra note 6, at 8 (ACLU does not accept
fees from clients).
38. See Evans v. JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1537-38 & n.14 .
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tion ethics committees, which was that defense counsel's attempt to cre-
ate and exploit such a conflict is the source of the ethical violation. 3',
Although this latter argument against simultaneous negotiation
was not specifically addressed or rejected by the Court inJeffD., it is
founded upon an incorrect interpretation of the rules of ethics.
Nothing in the ethics codes provides a basis for ruling unethical an
otherwise permissible action by a defense lawyer simply because it
creates a conflict of interest for opposing counsel. Except for cer-
tain narrow and specific limitations, 40 an attorney's obligation to ad-
vance his or her client's interests takes precedence over competing
concerns, whether they be the attorney's own or those of third
parties.4'
Furthermore, conditional settlement offers are hardly unique in
their capacity for creating a conflict for opposing counsel. Virtually
all settlement offers create such a conflict to some degree. For ex-
ample, where an attorney is compensated on a contingent fee basis,
he or she generally has an interest in settling earlier (even if for a
smaller sum) than does the client, since this enables the attorney to
avoid the substantial investment of time required to prepare and try
the case. 42 On the other hand, where an attorney is working for an
39. D.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24; N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24.
40. See Kraus, supra note 25, at 632.
41. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.3 comment (lawyer should be zealous, committed,
and dedicated advocate on behalf of client's interests), Rule 1.7 comment (loyalty is an
essential element in the lawyer's relationship with the client), Rule 3.1 comment (lawyer
has duty "to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause"); CODE,
supra note 26, DR 7-101 (lawyer must seek lawful objectives of client through any rea-
sonable and legal means, and must not prejudice client's interests), EC 5-1 (lawyer's
professional judgment must be exercised solely for benefit of client, within bounds of
the law, regardless of lawyer's personal interests or interests of third parties), EC 5-2
(lawyer should not assume position that might make his or her own interests conflict
with the client's), EC 5-21 (lawyer must disregard desires of third parties that conflict
with client's interests), EC 7-1 (attorney's duty to the legal system is to represent his or
her client zealously, within bounds of law), EC 7-9 (lawyer must always exercise discre-
tion consistently with client's best interests). The application of provisions such as EC
5-1 can be seen, for example, in ethics opinions requiring legal aid lawyers to place the
interests of their clients above both the lawyers' own interests and those of the legal aid
society. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970).
42. See Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation hwestmeat Decisions,
15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 567, 586-91 (1980-81). The conflict is particularly intense, and is
most likely to affect the clients' interests, in the context of class actions. See, e.g., Dam,
supra note 22, at 57; Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113, 115-16 (1976) (empirical study of 104 class actions indicating that settling
plaintiffs' attorneys accept smaller recovery for class in exchange for larger fee for them-
selves); see also Say!or v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-10 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.)
(recognizing and discussing inherent conflict). Permitting requests for fee limitations in
class actions could have the effect of increasing the amount of the class' recovery. This
is because fee waivers eliminate the attorney's usual incentive to settle for less than the
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hourly fee, he or she benefits most from prolonging the litigation as
long as possible, to the detriment of the client. 43 In both of these
situations, a settlement offer might cause the interests of attorney
and client to diverge, yet neither amounts to an ethical violation.
Indeed, the mere fact that settlement offers create this conflict of
interest has never been thought a reason for forbidding them.
Rather, courts have simply assumed additional control over the set-
tlement process, particularly in the problematic context of class ac-
tions, in order to prevent abuses by counsel.
44
Rule 8.4(a), which has no direct counterpart in the Code, bars an
attorney from knowingly inducing another to violate the rules of
professional conduct, 45 but a fee waiver offer is no more an induce-
ment to act unethically than is any other settlement offer. If condi-
tional settlement offers are to fall under Rule 8.4(a), then so must all
settlement offers. Indeed, when a defendant makes a request for a
fee limitation or waiver, his or her intention is not to induce plain-
tiff's counsel to violate any ethical obligations. 4 6 Rather, the oppo-
site is true: the defendant wants plaintiff's counsel to evaluate
objectively the offer's fairness to the plaintiff, not to reject the offer
class could otherwise obtain, thus making fully compensatory settlements (and trials)
more likely. The attorney has a duty to recommend against settlement where the offer is
inadequate; settlement offers conditioned on fee waivers simply remove the incentive to
ignore this duty.
43. Johnson, supra note 42, at 575-82.
44. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (court must approve settlements in class actions);
Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973)
(court has jurisdiction to review fairness of contingent fees); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d
35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (same).
45. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 8.4(a). Although the Code does not contain an ex-
plicit rule barring inducements to unethical conduct, various Code provisions could be
read to imply such a prohibition. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 26, Canon 1 (lawyer should
assist in maintaining integrity of profession), Canon 9 (lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of impropriety), DR 1-102(A)(2) (lawyer shall not circumvent DRs through
actions of another).
46. If the defendant makes a split settlement offer which attempts to allocate benefits
between fees and merits, however, the defendant's attorney may indeed be trying to
induce plaintiff's counsel to act unethically. Rule 8.4(a) would be violated if the defend-
ant had intentionally set the fee portion of the offer higher than appropriate, and the
merits portion correspondingly lower, in an attempt to induce the plaintiff's attorney to
recommend acceptance even though the client would receive less in damages and/or
injunctive relief than his or her claim was objectively worth. But the fact that such offers
are unethical should not translate into a ban on the opposite type of situation, in which
defendant's offer benefits the plaintiff by reducing or eliminating the fee award. Suffi-
cient safeguards exist to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from taking advantage of what are
in effect bribe or "sweetheart" offers. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 44. It would
be appropriate, however, to ban all split offers which consist solely of money damages.
In such situations, the defendant has no legitimate interest in attempting to allocate the
award between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney; it therefore would be reasonable
to presume that the defendant's offer was fashioned in this manner for improper reasons
- as either a bribe or a punishment for the plaintiff's lawyer.
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out of hand because it injures the lawyer's own interests. This is
simply not the type of situation to which the Rule was intended to
apply. Thus, the fact that conditional settlement offers create a con-
flict of interest does not render them unethical.
C. Special Duties of Government Lawyers
Even if conditional settlement offers may be made ethically by
lawyers representing private defendants, it is argued that the special
position of government lawyers imposes on them a duty to refrain
from making such offers in cases where the government is a defend-
ant. 47 This argument draws support from EC 7-14, which discour-
ages government attorneys from using their positions or "the
economic power of the government" to obtain "unfair" settle-
ments. 48 Since requests for fee waivers place plaintiffs' attorneys in
an extremely difficult position, the argument runs, government
counsel should refrain from making such requests.
The Code does not support such a rule. The special limitations
on the conduct of government attorneys are intended to protect op-
posing parties, not opposing counsel.49 Settlements involving fee
waivers or limitations are simply not unfair to plaintiffs; if anything,
such settlement offers benefit civil rights plaintiffs. A limit on attor-
ney's fees enables plaintiffs, in some circumstances, to obtain more
complete relief than they would otherwise obtain.50 Where a gov-
ernment attorney proposes a conditional settlement offer that in-
creases the size of the plaintiff's award, the plaintiff can hardly
complain of any violation of the government attorney's duty.
D. liolation of the Lawyer's Right to Practice
A final objection to conditional settlement offers is that they vio-
late the policy considerations behind the Code's and Rules' "assur-
ance of the public's right to counsel through the lawyer's right to
practice." ' 5' In part, this objection relies on the theory that condi-
47. See D.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24; N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24.
48. CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-14. This EC (which has no counterpart in the Rules)
is, of course, not mandatory, and therefore cannot itself support disciplinary action
against violators.
49. Id.
50. See Evans v. JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1540-41; see also infra note 106.
51. D.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24, at 8 (quoting Committee on Legal Ethics of the
D.C. Bar, Op. 130); see also N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24. This objection to fee
waivers is based on an analogy to DR 2-108(B), which provides that "[i]n connection
with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
that restricts his right to practice law." CODE, supra note 26, DR 2-108(B); see also




tional settlement offers subvert the congressional policy underlying
the Fees Act by discouraging attorneys from bringing civil rights ac-
tions. Proponents of this theory argue that Congress, by enacting
the Fees Act to encourage enforcement of civil rights, created a pub-
lic right to assistance of counsel in meritorious civil rights cases. 5
2
After the Supreme Court's decision inJeffD., however, the Act can
no longer be read in such a broad manner. Manifestly there is no
"public right" to counsel attracted by fee awards, other than
whatever right may have been created by the Fees Act itself, and the
Supreme Court has definitively stated that rights under that statute
belong to, and may be waived by, the individual plaintiff.5 3 No
"public right" is violated; rather, a private right is exchanged by the
possessor of that right for other perceived benefits.
To the extent that this argument relies on the theory that condi-
tional offers would violate the lawyer's right to practice, it also suf-
fers a fatal weakness. There is an obvious difference between the
type of offers at issue here and those forbidden by the ethics codes
as violative of the attorney's right to practice. The ethics code pro-
visions were designed specifically to prevent settlement offers condi-
tioned on agreement by plaintiffs' attorneys not to represent other
parties in future suits against the settling defendants. 54 This type of
agreement is a direct contractual bar to the attorney's right to take
any cases involving a certain defendant, a far cry from the mere
elimination of the attorney's opportunity to receive a statutory fee
from the defendant in a given case. In fact, acceptance of a fee
waiver settlement does not restrict the plaintiff's attorney's legal
right to receive a fee - he or she still has a claim against the plaintiff
for the reasonable value of his or her services.5 5 Even if the plaintiff
type of agreement and the request for a fee waiver are both "unethical because they
violate the same public policy of assuring that the supply of competent legal representa-
tives, with specialized knowledge and skills, is not curtailed through the settlement pro-
cess." Kraus, supra note 25, at 632.
52. See D.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24; N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 24.
53. Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. at 1539. Before the Supreme Court decided Jeff D.,
some courts had ruled that the statutory fee actually belonged to the attorney rather
than the client, despite clear statutory language to the contrary. See. e.g., James v. Home
Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). These cases are now, of course,
overruled.
54. Ru.ES, supra note 27, Rule 5.6(b) comment; CODE, supra note 26. DR 2-108(B);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1039 (1968).
55. See RtJi.Es, supra note 27, Rule 1.80j) (attorney may enforce lien against client's
judgment); COD, supra note 26, DR 5-103(A)(1) (same); see also LAWYER s' MIANU, supranote 28, § 41:2101-02 (listing state attorneys' lien statutes). Many legal aid and public
interest law firms do not accept fees from clients, however, and thus will receive nothing
ifthe statutory fee is waived. See iniia note 73. But these organizations' decisions not to
seek fees from clients were made voluntarily, without any coercive influence whatsoever
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is indigent, and therefore unable to pay his or her lawyer, the lawyer
has lost nothing to which he or she was legally entitled: the right to
the statutory fee belongs to the plaintiff, and may be waived or lim-
ited as the plaintiff sees fit.
56
The ethics rules governing the legal profession do not render set-
tlement offers conditioned on fee limitations or waivers unethical in
themselves. This conclusion means that attorneys will often be
placed in the difficult position of negotiating fee waivers or limita-
tions, and thus raises additional questions concerning the ethical
limitations on attorney conduct in such situations. Chief among
these are (1) the extent to which a plaintiff's lawyer may avoid being
forced to accept a reduced or waived fee, and (2) the remaining ethi-
cal constraints on defense counsel engaged in simultaneous settle-
ment negotiations in civil rights cases.
III. Ethical Obligations of Plaintiffs' Attorneys in Negotiating Fees
with Defendants
The rules of ethics governing attorney behavior make clear that
the attorney's primary duty is to advance the interests of his or her
client.57 An attorney's financial, social, or moral interests cannot be
permitted to interfere with this duty of loyalty. 58 Thus, when faced
with a settlement offer that includes a fee waiver or limitation, the
attorney has no choice but to evaluate it in terms of its fairness to his
or her client, regardless of the possibility that the attorney (or his or
her employer or affiliated organization) may lose part or all of the
statutory fee. Without the independent, informed, and uninflu-
enced consent of his or her client, the lawyer cannot ethically avoid
the necessity of engaging in good faith simultaneous negotiation of
merits and fees.
The duty of loyalty applies to legal aid and public interest lawyers
as well as to private practitioners and government counsel. - ) It has
been noted that attorneys employed by "public interest" organiza-
from civil rights defendants. Clearly this is not the type of conduct barred by Rule
5.6(b) or DR 2-108(B).
56. See supra note 53.
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; cf supra note 40.
58. Rui.Es, supra note 27, Rule 1.7(b) & comment; CODE, supra note 26, EC 5-1, EC
5-2, EC 7-1.
59. See Developments - Conflicts, supra note 28, at 1406, 1447; Oregon State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 402 (June 1978) ("Iegal Aid lawyers have the same ethical
obligations and are bound by the same rules as all other lawyers"); see also Legal Services
Corporation Act §§ 1006(b)(3), 1007(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(b)(3), 2996f(a)(10)




tions are subject to conflicting loyalties when, as often happens, the
interests of their clients are at odds with the organization's political,
social, or legal agenda.60 Thus, for example, a large cash settlement
offer could be clearly in the best interests of the plaintiff, yet the
attorney might desire to proceed to trial in hopes of obtaining a
landmark judicial ruling recognizing a new legal right, a result which
would benefit other clients of the firm in future litigation, or would
better serve the attorney's conception of the "public interest." Re-
gardless of the appeal of the goals of the attorney or the attorney's
organization, the ethics codes dictate that these goals be ignored if
doing so is necessary to serve the client faithfully. 6 1
It has been suggested by civil rights advocates that one way to
avoid conditional settlement is for the plaintiff's lawyer simply to
refuse to negotiate the question of fees with defendants. 62 Such an
approach would, it is suggested, provide the plaintiff's attorney with
a complete and efficient solution to the problem. Under the rules of
ethics, however, it is beyond question that an attorney may not take
such a position on his or her own initiative. A refusal to discuss the
matter of fees violates the duty to act always in the client's best in-
terests, 63 since plaintiffs may benefit from an agreement to waive or
60. See, e.g., Krash, Professional Responsibility To Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a
Conflict?, 55 CHIC. B. REC. 31, 34 (Special Centennial Issue 1974); Developments - Con-
flicts, supra note 28, at 1457-69; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1332 (1975); see also Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Current Topic, The Legal
Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 158, 170-75 (1985).
61. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.7 & comment, Rule 1.8(f); CODE, supra note 26,
Canon 5, DR 5-107, EC's 5-21 to 5-24; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (legal aid lawyer's exercise of professional judg-
ment on behalf of client may not be subject to interference or veto by others in organiza-
tion); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970) (legal aid lawyer must
avoid being influenced by legal aid society's goals at the expense of "impairing his pri-
mary obligation of loyalty to his client"); State Bar of New Mexico Advisory Opinions
Comm., Op. 1984-11 (Dec. 19, 1984).
62. This option has not only been recommended by commentators, see, e.g., Note,
Settlement Negotiations: Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Simultaneously Negotiating the .Merits and
Statutorily Authorized Attorney's Fees, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 651, 668 (1984), but is apparently
the policy of at least one public interest law firm. See Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 12, White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Em-
ployment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982) [hereinafter NAACP Brief] ("Amicus itself has ...
adopted the absolute position that it will not discuss fees in the course of settlement
negotiations ...").
63. See generally supra note 4 1. A similar ethical problem arises where plaintiff's attor-
ney, though not directly refusing to negotiate the issue of fees, repeatedly puts off dis-
cussion on the ground that he or she needs consent from a superior in his or her
organization. See ACI.U Memorandum, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing such a system for
making fee waiver agreements difficult). This practice is ethically questionable on its
face. Cf CoDE, supra note 26, Canon 9 (lawyers should avoid even the appearance of
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limit fees in some circumstances. For the same reason, an attorney
may not decline to communicate such an offer to his client unless it
is perfectly clear that it would be unacceptable. 64 And in determin-
ing whether the conditional offer would be unacceptable, the attor-
ney must be especially careful to protect the client's interests and to
avoid any consideration of self-interest, and must resolve any doubt
in favor of informing the client. 65
The attorney's ethical obligations do not cease upon communica-
tion of the offer to the client. He or she should reveal the conflict of
interest and then discuss the various options with the client, point-
ing out the legal and other consequences of each. 66 In discussing a
settlement offer conditioned on a fee limitation or waiver, the attor-
ney may explain the need for attorney's fee awards to support con-
tinued civil rights litigation, and may even appeal to the plaintiff's
sense of justice or morality in this regard.67 It is possible that even
an indigent plaintiff would be willing to reject an otherwise
impropriety). In any case, such a practice would clearly be improper if it had the effect
of interfering with the negotiating lawyer's ability to serve effectively the client's best
interests. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974).
64. See Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443, 445
(1980) (attorneys have a legal duty to disclose and discuss with clients all good faith
offers to settle); RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.4(a) comment (lawyer must inform client of
any possibly acceptable settlement offers); CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-8, EC 9-2 (lawyer
should ensure that client has all relevant information needed to make decisions about
the litigation, and should fully inform the client of all material developments in the
case); Committee on Professional Ethics of the Birmingham Bar Ass'n, Op. 81-06 (Aug.
14, 1981); see also In re Ratzel, 108 Wis.2d 447, 321 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1982) (attorney
disciplined for failing to keep client adequately informed of progress of settlement
negotiations).
65. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.4(a) comment ("A lawyer may not withhold in-
formation to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience"); see generally supra note 41.
In fact, an attorney may be obligated to disclose all settlement offers that include re-
quests for limits on statutory fees, for the simple reason that they create a conflict of
interest which must be disclosed to the client. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.7(b)(2); cf.
CODE, supra note 26, DR 5-101(A) (lawyer must disclose actual and potential conflicts of
interest before accepting employment).
66. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.4 comment; CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-8; Ethics
Comm. of the Bd. of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
Op. 84-F-77 (Oct. 17, 1984) (lawyer must inform client of all possible settlement op-
tions, but may not attempt to influence client's choice).
67. See Ru.Es, supra note 27, Rule 2.1 comment (lawyer may "refer to relevant moral
and ethical considerations in giving advice"); CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-8 (attorney may
point out unjust or harsh consequences that might result from a particular action that is
legally permissible). An attorney who chose to exercise this option would, however, be
treading perilously close to the line demarcating impermissible conflicts of interest. By
far the safer course would be to discuss this issue only at the initial stage of litigation,
and thereafter not to initiate discussions of it with the client, for fear of improperly
influencing the client's decision. Moreover, where the plaintiff is an incompetent indi-
vidual or a large, unorganized class, the attorney's duty of loyalty is heightened, and he
or she should make recommendations based solely on the best interests of the client or
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favorable settlement offer merely because he or she wished to se-
cure adequate compensation for the attorneys or additional punish-
ment for the defendants. However, the attorney must not coerce or
attempt to influence the client in an attempt to obtain a rejection of
a favorable settlement offer that includes inadequate fees. In fact, if
the attorney objectively believes a conditional settlement offer to be
in the best interests of the plaintiff, the attorney is ethically bound to
recommend acceptance of the offer.68 The attorney must at all
times be motivated by concern for the client's interests, 69 and must
abide by the client's settlement decisions. 70
Because a conditional settlement offer makes it difficult for the
attorney to continue to advise the plaintiff objectively, the preferred
course of action is to discuss fee arrangements, the conflict of inter-
est created by simultaneous negotiation, and similar factors at the
outset of the attorney-client relationship, before the problem arises.
Although not a panacea for the problems posed by conditional set-
tlement offers, discussion of the issue at this stage of the representa-
tion is the best opportunity for making objective, well-considered
decisions concerning the scope and purpose of the representation
and the appropriate response to conditional settlement offers,
should they be made later in the litigation. 7' The results of these
preliminary negotiations establishing the attorney-client relation-
ship may be memorialized in a written retainer agreement,72 which
should at a minimum summarize the general understanding be-
tween the client and the lawyer regarding the scope and purposes of
the representation. It could also provide that the plaintiff would be
liable for a reasonable fee, perhaps contingent on the award re-
client class. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.14, Rule 1.4 comment; CODE, supra note 26,
EC 7-12.
68. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1; CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-5, EC 7-8,
EC 7-9.
69. See Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan,
Informal Op. CI-592 (March 14, 1981) (in making recommendations to his client, "[a]
lawyer cannot permit his personal profit to motivate his course of action in the slightest
degree"); see also supra note 41.
70. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.2(a) (lawyer must abide by client's decision whether
to settle); CODE, sipra note 26, EC 7-7, EC 7-8.
71. This procedure is suggested by several commentators. See, e.g., Bennett, Settle-
meit of Cases in Which Statutoiy Attorneys' Fees are .iuthorized: An Ethical Dilemma, ACLU
LAw., Aug. 1983, at 5, 13; Levin, supra note 25, at 520; ACLU Memorandum, supra note
6, at 8. Even in these preliminary negotiations, the attorney must not attempt to influ-
ence or control the client's decisions. The problem may not be avoided "by instructing
the client beforehand that [simultaneous negotiation] is unethical," as one commentator
has proposed. See Note, sipra note 62, at 668 n.92.
72. See RULEs, supra note 27, Rule 1.5(b), (c) (written fee agreements are generally
preferred, and are required for contingent fee arrangements).
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ceived, in the event that the plaintiff chose to waive statutory attor-
ney's fees. 7
3
Use of a retainer agreement does not, however, allow the attorney
to avoid any of the previously discussed limitations on attorney con-
duct. Thus, the agreement could not provide that the attorney
would not engage in simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits, or
that he or she could reject out of hand any settlement offer contain-
ing less than a specified fee award.74 Merely requesting that such
provisions be included would probably violate the attorney's ethical
obligations to his or her client, particularly where the obvious pur-
pose is to increase the lawyer's chance of receiving a fee at the ex-
73. Providing that the client will be liable for reasonable attorney's fees in the event
he or she waives statutory fees will, however, be of little practical effect in many cases.
See Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Non-Negotiable Fee Awards
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 353-56 (1984). Most clients of civil
rights attorneys are indigent - this was the primary motivating factor in the enactment
of the Fees Act - and thus will be unable to pay any fees unless they receive substantial
damage awards. Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. at 1552 & n.9. Moreover, for legal, ethical,
and policy reasons, many public interest and legal aid organizations do not accept fees
from their clients. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1985) (federally funded legal aid societies
may not accept reimbursement from clients, other than for out-of-pocket expenses);
ACLU Memorandum, supra note 6, at 7-8 (as a matter of policy, ACLU does not seek
fees from clients). Public interest law firms (as distinguished from legal aid organiza-
tions) that maintain tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
may not accept fees from their clients without losing their tax exempt status, Rev. Proc.
75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662; Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154, nor may they "use the likeli-
hood or probability of a fee award as a consideration" in selecting cases. Rev. Proc. 75-
13 § 3.03, 1975-1 C.B. 662.
Another potential problem has not previously been discussed, but could be of signifi-
cance. By virtue of the first amendment, public interest lawyers enjoy exemption from
certain ethics code constraints on solicitation of clients. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978). This exemption is dependent at least in part on the fact that public interest
law firms do not condition their legal representation on an entitlement to attorney's
fees. 436 U.S. at 426-3 1. Requiring clients to enter into retainer agreements providing
for payments of fees would weaken the justification for this exemption. Cf. RULES, supra
note 27, Rule 7.3; CODE, supra note 26, DR 2-104(A)(2), (3).
74. Such agreements are invalid because they impermissibly infringe the client's ab-
solute right to decide whether to accept a settlement offer. See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (agreement giving attorney power to
make settlement decisions without client's consent is contrary to the basic tenets of the
attorney-client relationship); Giles v. Russel, 222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845, 850 (1977)
(retainer agreement that prevents client from settling without attorney's consent is void
as against public policy); RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.2 comment ("the client mav not
be asked ... to surrender ... the right to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to.
continue"); F. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAl. SERVICES 74-75 (1964); see also
supra note 70.
The Connecticut Committee on Professional Ethics issued an opinion specifically ap-
proving the practice of entering into retainer agreements which give the attorney the
right to reject a settlement that provides for an inadequate fee. Connecticut Bar Opin-
ion, supra note 24. This opinion was apparently based in part on the mistaken belief that
the right to attorney's fees belongs to the attorney rather than the client. Id. But see
supra text accompanying note 53. In1 any case, this is a startlingly incorrect interpreta-
tion of the applicable ethics code provisions (none of which were cited in the opinion).
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pense of the client's right to settle. 75  Similarly, the retainer
agreement cannot provide for an "assignment" from the client to
the attorney of the right to recover statutory fees. 76 This would do
nothing to lessen the inherent conflict of interest created by a condi-
tional settlement offer, and would again impermissibly infringe the
client's ultimate ability to settle cases by giving the attorney veto
power over any settlement that provided for an inadequate fee. In
addition, an assignment of statutory fees would directly contravene
another ethics rule: lawyers are strictly forbidden from acquiring
any proprietary interest in their clients' causes of action.
77
Objective application of the ethics codes to the various methods
that plaintiffs' counsel might use to escape the conflict of interest
posed by simultaneous negotiation of attorney's fees and substan-
tive merits leads inescapably to the conclusion that in many cases
the conflict cannot ethically be avoided.78 Therefore, plaintiffs' at-
torneys must be prepared to ignore completely their own interests
in order to further those of their clients; if unable to do this, they
75. Several commentators have suggested that plaintiffs' attorneys should attempt to
obtain such agreements from their clients. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 71, at 13; Levin,
supra note 25, at 520 & n.53; Note, supra note 62, at 668; ACLU Memorandum, supra
note 6, at 6-8. Although the ethics codes do not specifically forbid such agreements,
case law does render them unenforceable, see supra note 74, and to include them in the
retainer agreement would therefore serve no purpose but to mislead the client as to his
or her rights, clearly an impermissible result in the context of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.4 comment (lawyer must not withhold mate-
rial information from client to serve own interests); see generally supra note 41.
76. This procedure has also been suggested as a means for avoiding the problem of
fee waiver proposals. See ACLU Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6.
77. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.8(j); CODE, supra note 26, DR 5-103(A). The only
two exceptions to the prohibition against acquiring an interest in the litigation relate to
contingent fee arrangements and liens for fees owed, clearly inapplicable to an assign-
ment of the client's claim for attorney's fees. See RULES, siipra note 27, Rule 1.8(j)(1), (2);
CODE, supra note 26, DR 5-103(A)(1), (2).
The rule against acquiring an interest in the litigation also bars efforts by the attorney
to induce the client not to settle. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics of the Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 82-11 (1982) (attorney representing indigent
plaintiffs may not guarantee them a certain recovery regardless of result at trial in order
to induce rejection of inadequate settlement offers); Committee on Ethics of the Mary-
land State Bar Ass'n, Inc., Op. 82-41 (Mar. 11, 1982) (attorney may not make cash ad-
vances to indigent clients to enable them to avoid accepting inadequate settlement offer
because of financial need).
78. One other means for plaintiffs' counsel to avoid the merits-fee conflict is sug-
gested by Regalado v.Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In Regalado the subject of
fees was not discussed during settlement negotiations. After settlement was reached
and a consent decree entered, however, the plaintiff's attorney moved for an award of
attorney's fees in addition to the agreed-upon substantive reiief. The court awarded
fees despite the defendants' contention that the consent order was intended fully to
resolve all outstanding issues. Id. at 449-451. The Regalado court bolstered its holding
by citing Prandini for the proposition that it would have been improper for either party's
attorney "to inject the question of attorney's fees into the balance of settlement discus-
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should decline the representation at the outset. 79 Attorneys may in
no way attempt to influence their clients to reject favorable condi-
tional settlement offers; the decision must be left to the client.
IV. The Ethical Obligations of Defense Counsel
Defense counsel are subject to the same obligations of zealous
and loyal advocacy on behalf of their clients as are their oppo-
nents.80 As conditional settlement offers are legally and ethically
permissible, defense counsel must seek to negotiate fees and merits
simultaneously whenever this is in the best interests of the defend-
ant. Due to the potentially large size and the unpredictability of fee
sions." Id. at 451. Thus, the court concluded, the fee issue had been left unresolved of
necessity.
Other courts have reasoned similarly when presented with settlement agreements si-
lent as to fees. See, e.g., Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D.P.R. 1983) (court
will assume that parties' silence as to matter of fees is based on ethical and practical
problems of simultaneous negotiation, and thus no waiver of fees will be inferred);Jones
v. Orange Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D.N.J. 1983) ("indeed, had plaintiff's
attorney initiated any [discussion of fees], she would have been acting improperly").
However, remaining silent about fees in this way is risky at best. Most courts will at-
tempt to make some sort of determination of the parties' intent, and especially now that
the validity of fee waivers is clear, courts may more easily find that a fee award was not
intended. Several courts of appeals reached this result prior toJeffD., all relying at least
implicitly on a belief that fee waivers or limitations were permissible. See, e.g., Brown v.
General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 722 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1983) (settlement
"without costs" found to show intent to forego fee award); Jennings v. Metropolitan
Gov't, 715 F.2d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v.
Stover, 624 F.2d at 131-32 (since settlement agreement is silent as to attorney's fees,
court remands for determination of parties' intent, noting that fees could have been
waived).
The Third Circuit recently reexamined this issue in light ofJeffD. See Ashley v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986). While acknowledging that its previous
decision in Prandini had been effectively overruled by Jeff D., the court relied on a
Prandini-like view of the congressional policy of the Fees Act to support its creation of an
irrebuttable presumption that settlements silent as to attorney's fees did not result in a
waiver thereof. Id. at 138-39. It remains to be seen whether this rule will find adherents
elsewhere.
Although remaining silent about attorney's fees until after settlement is not expressly
proscribed by the ethics codes, it may be inconsistent with the attorney's duty to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety, CODE, supra note 26, Canon 9, and to deal fairly and
honestly with opposing parties and counsel, see RULES, supra note 27, Rule 3.4, Rule
4.1(a); CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-10, EC 7-37. In any case, however, this tactic will
probably be of little practical use in the future. When defendants' attorneys realize that
they are ethically obligated to inject the issue of fees into settlement negotiations in all
civil rights cases, see infra text accompanying notes 80-86, it will be impossible for plain-
tiffs' attorneys to avoid the issue by remaining silent. And once the parties reach an
agreement as to fees, the plaintiff's attorney will not be able to increase his or her award
by asking the court to set a reasonable fee. Evans v. JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1537 (court has
no power to impose fee award on defendants while keeping remainder of settlement
agreement intact, where settlement agreement waived fees).
79. RUL.Es, snpra note 27, Rule 1.7; CODE, spra note 26, DR 5-101(A), EC 5-1.
80. See sipra note 41.
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awards,"' a recommendation to settle a case without trying to re-
solve the issue of attorney's fees will rarely be in a defendant's best
interests, and could violate the defense attorney's obligation to pro-
vide competent representation.
82
The Code and Rules do mitigate in some respects the attorney's
absolute duty to advance the interests of his or her client. Thus, it
would not be improper for a defense lawyer to point out to his or
her client the problems faced by civil rights attorneys, legal aid soci-
eties, and public interest law firms when confronted with conditional
settlement offers.8 3 Anything more than this would, however, be
unethical. The permissibility of pointing out moral considerations
militating against the assumption of a certain bargaining position
does not give an attorney the right to recommend or attempt to
achieve results not in the client's interests.8 4 Ultimately, the settle-
ment decision is for the client alone.
8 5
In virtually all cases, the defense attorney will be obligated to in-
ject the fee issue into the settlement negotiations, and may rightfully
81. See Evans v.JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1541-42. Court-awarded attorney's fees in civil
rights cases may be quite sizeable. See, e.g., White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458
(9th Cir. 1983) ($694,000 fee award); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983) ($455,000 award); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal.
1980) ($2.2 million award); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo.
1977) ($360,000 award). Because such awards need not bear any relationship to the
value of the relief obtained for plaintiff, defendants find it difficult to estimate their po-
tential liability for fees. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2686
(1986) ($245,000 fee award upheld in case where plaintiffs obtained a total judgment of
$33,350); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1984) (fee award of
$112,000 in suit to obtain liquor license); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (en banc) ($33,000 verdict, $160,000 fee award); see also National Ass'n of Attor-
neys General, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Report to Congress, at
29 (1984) [hereinafter NAAG Report] (states report that their payments for attorney's
fee awards in civil rights cases approach or exceed total payments for merits awards);
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 379 n.5 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can know with any degree of certainty how
much of the attorney's fees a prevailing plaintiff seeks will be allowed by a trial court
.. ."). Even though the Supreme Court has eliminated some of the causes of variations
in fee awards, large differences will of necessity remain from case to case and court to
court. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-902 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3100 (1986) (setting
down for reargument the question of whether fee awards may be adjusted upward to
account for the risk of losing the case).
82. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.1; CODE, supra note 26, DR 6-101 (A).
83. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 2.1 & comment, Rule 1.2(d); CODE, supra note 26, EC
7-8, EC 7-9.
84. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.3 & comment; CODE, supra note 26, Canon 7 (zeal-
ous representation of the client required), DR 7-101(A) (lawyer must pursue client's
objectives through all reasonable means and must not prejudice client's interests).
85. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 1.2(a); CODE, supra note 26, EC 7-7, EC 7-8.
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expect plaintiff's counsel to bargain in good faith on the issue.8 6 As
has been demonstrated, plaintiffs' attorneys are ethically barred
from avoiding simultaneous negotiation without their clients' in-
formed and uninfluenced consent. In some cases, though, plaintiffs'
attorneys may misunderstand or even ignore the command of the
ethics codes. What options are available to a defense attorney who
is confronted with an attempt by plaintiff's counsel to avoid this
issue?
It is clear that the defendant's lawyer cannot simply circumvent
opposing counsel's refusal to negotiate by communicating his or her
client's settlement offer directly to the plaintiff. If made without the
consent of opposing counsel, such communication unethically inter-
feres with the attorney-client relationship and is strictly forbidden.
8 7
A permissible remedy is to bring the impasse in negotiation to the
attention of the court in one of several ways. The least aggressive
means of doing this is an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifying the defendant's total
settlement offer, including costs and attorney's fees. s8 This offer
can then be filed with the court, thus informing it of the current
status of the negotiations and indicating the existence of plaintiff's
attorney's conflict of interest.89 The mere fact that the court has
86. See supra text accompanying notes 57-79. There may, however, still be some
legal limitations on a defendant's right to request fee waivers. InJeffD. the Supreme
Court left open the possibility that such offers might be invalid in three situations: (1)
where defendant has adopted a policy or practice of demanding fee waivers in all suits;
(2) where the defendant had no reasonable defense on the merits; and (3) where the
waiver was requested pursuant to "a vindictive effort to deter attorneys" from bringing
civil rights actions. Evans v.JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1543-44. The resolution of these legal
questions is beyond the scope of this Current Topic. It should be noted, however, that
no ethics rule would be violated if a defendant adopted a policy of demanding fee waivers
in all suits. Where the second or third factors mentioned by the Supreme Court are also
present, however, defense counsel probably cannot ethically demand fee waivers, since
making such a request could violate their obligations to avoid taking wholly unjustified,
frivolous positions and to treat opposing counsel and parties fairly when possible.
RULES, supra note 27, Rule 3.1, Rule 3.4; CODE, supra note 26, DR 7-102(A)(1), EC 7-10,
EC 7-37.
87. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 4.2; CODE, supra note 26, DR 7-104(A)(1); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1348 (1975) (attorney
may not send opposing party a settlement offer, even if he has reason to believe oppos-
ing counsel is not communicating offers to his client). But see infra note 89. Moreover,
the attorney may not request or advise his or her client or a third party to communicate
with the opposing party. The attorney need not forbid such contact, however, so long as
he or she does not motivate or suggest it in any way. See San Diego County Bar Ass'n
Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1983-2 (1983).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 68; see also Marek v. Chesny, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3015-6
(1985) (lump sum offers that do not differentiate among damages, attorney's fees, and
other costs qualify as Rule 68 offers).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 5 provides, inter alia, that defendants' offers ofjudgment are to be
served on opposing parties' counsel and that a copy of such offers shall be filed with the
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been made aware of the settlement offer may be enough to cause the
plaintiff's attorney to enter into good faith negotiations. It could
also, of course, serve to limit defendant's exposure in the event the
case proceeds to trial, since if the plaintiff obtains a final judgment
that is less favorable to him or her than was the Rule 68 settlement
offer, the defendant will not be liable for any attorney's fees or costs
incurred after the offer was made.90
In addition to a Rule 68 offer, defense counsel can bring the prob-
lem to the court's attention more directly by means of a request for
a pretrial conference to discuss the parties' inability to settle.9 1
Such conferences are intended, among other things, to facilitate set-
tlement negotiations, and failure of an attorney to participate in the
conference in good faith may result in sanctions.9 2 This would
therefore provide a suitable forum for revealing the impasse and re-
questing the court's assistance in determining whether plaintiff's
counsel's actions are justified.93 Given the crowded state of federal
district court civil dockets,9 4 the judge is likely to be sympathetic to
the defendant's desire to settle, and may be willing to bring consid-
erable pressure to bear on a recalcitrant plaintiff's attorney if that is
necessary to encourage meaningful settlement negotiations.
Attempting to bring charges of unethical conduct is the most
drastic option available to defense counsel. Of course, such charges
are generally looked upon with disfavor.95 They are nonetheless
clerk of the court or with the judge. Defendant may apparently request that the court
order direct service on the opposing party, under Rule 5(b). This arguably would not
violate the general ban on direct communication with opposing parties represented by
counsel, since the communication would have occurred pursuant to a valid rule of pro-
cedure. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 985 (1967) (if expressly pro-
vided for in procedural rules, direct service of offer of judgment on opposing party is
ethically permissible, so long as attorney obtaining such direct service has no improper
motives).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 68. In determining whether a Rule 68 offer exceeds the judgment
at trial, the court must compare the offer amount with the sum of the damages awarded
at trial and the costs and attorney's fees accrued at the time the settlement offer was made.
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds, - U.S.-, 105
S. Ct. 3012 (1985). If the defendant's offer ofjudgment does not exceed the costs and
fees accrued to date, it will by definition be smaller than any judgment plaintiff obtains
at trial. Rule 68 provides a particularly strong incentive for early settlement offers in
civil rights cases, because it allows defendants to "lock in" a low attorney's fee award.
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
93. However, the court's ability to determine the validity of a refusal to negotiate by
the plaintiff's attorney might be limited by assertions of the attorney-client privilege.
94. In the twelve-month period endingJune 30, 1986, 254,828 civil cases were filed
in United States District Court, and 265,771 civil cases were terminated. 1986 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 36, Tables C3, C4.
95. See Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 860 (W.D. Mo. 1980); RULES, supra note
27, Rule 1.7 comment (Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party).
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permissible, and have sometimes been effective. 96 Although the
general rule is that only a present or former client has standing to
object to a conflict of interest,97 anyone may raise an ethical issue
when the public interest or the fair administration of justice is
threatened. 98 Such challenges are most likely to succeed in the class
action context, since the class attorney's failure to negotiate on be-
half of the class goes directly to the issue of adequacy of representa-
tion,99 and cannot be cured by consent of the class representative.
Charging the plaintiff's lawyer with misconduct is a course that
should be followed only as a last resort, and only where defense
counsel has reasonable grounds for believing an ethical violation ex-
ists. In bringing such charges, defense counsel runs a serious risk:
an unfounded ethical complaint may itself be grounds for sanctions
against the complaining attorney.' 00 Except in a class action situa-
tion, the mere refusal of a plaintiff's attorney to negotiate fees
would not generally support such a complaint, since it is entirely
possible that the plaintiff might refuse to waive or limit his statutory
fees without having been subjected to any improper suggestion or
coercion by counsel.
These techniques are not completely satisfactory; a defense attor-
ney will probably be unable to force an unwilling plaintiff's attorney
to negotiate fees if the latter adamantly refuses to do so. However,
it seems likely that singleminded refusal will not be a common phe-
96. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (defendants successfully
challenged continued representation by plaintiffs' attorney whose representation con-
flicted with the interests of another of his clients, where the latter client did not
consent).
97. Celanese Corp. v. Lessona Corp. (In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig.),
530 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1976); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. at 861.
98. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d at 265 (counsel can and should raise issue of opposing
counsel's ethical violation); Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 98; Black v. Missouri, 492
F. Supp. at 861. An attorney is also obligated to report ethics violations to the appropri-
ate professional authority. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 8.3(a); CODE, supra note 26, DR I-
103(A). However, fulfilling this obligation would not solve the immediate problem of
the need to negotiate fees.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665 (D. Ariz. 1978).
Even after class certification, the court has the authority to review the conduct of the
class representatives and their counsel, and to impose appropriate conditions on them.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
100. See RULES, supra note 27, Rule 3.1 (lawyer must not assert frivolous or un-
founded claims); CODE, supra note 26, DR 7-102(A)(1) (lawyer must not take actions
solely to harass opponent); cf. RULES, supra note 27, Rule 8.4(c), (d); CODE, supra note
26, DR 1-102(A)(4), (5). However, defense counsel's potential liability may be limited.
See, e.g., Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md.App. 628, 329 A.2d 423 (1974) (attorney who filed
ethics complaint with state bar association was protected by absolute privilege against




nomenon. Most plaintiffs' attorneys will presumably continue to act
ethically in conducting settlement negotiations, and defense counsel
will be able to ensure good faith bargaining by merely informing
their opponents of their obligations with regard to conditional set-
tlement offers.' 0 ' The possibilities of censure from the court or dis-
ciplinary action by the bar will provide additional incentives to act
ethically for those attorneys who might otherwise be tempted to ig-
nore their obligations to their clients.
V. The Impact of Simultaneous Negotiation
The rules of ethics, like the Fees Act itself, forbid a plaintiff's law-
yer from avoiding on his or her own initiative the conflict of interest
created by conditional settlement offers. Members of the civil rights
plaintiffs' bar have expressed the fear that permitting fee waivers
will severely weaken enforcement of civil rights by drastically reduc-
ing the number of attorneys willing to take such cases.' 0 2 Despite
these gloomy predictions, however, simultaneous negotiation is not
likely to reduce the volume of meritorious civil rights litigation sig-
nificantly, and is in fact justifiable from a policy standpoint.
In reality, the funding of public interest and legal aid organiza-
tions does not depend to any critical degree on statutory attorney's
fees. Available data indicate that, at most, only about twenty per-
cent of the funding of these law firms comes from this source.
03
The fact that fee waivers are now permissible will probably not re-
duce even this figure substantially.' 0 4 Certainly in civil rights suits
101. See Kraus, supra note 25, at 627-28; cf. Levin, supra note 25, at 520-21 (arguing
that conditional settlement offers are probably unethical, and that merely confronting
defense counsel with this fact will often result in withdrawal of such offers).
102. Bennett, supra note 71, at 13 (simultaneous negotiation's "long-range implica-
tion for civil rights litigation, especially by the private bar, would be devastating"); Re-
port of the Third Circuit Task Force: Court Awarded Attorney Fees 41, reprinted in 108
F.R.D. 237, 267 (1985) [hereinafter Third Circuit Report].
103. See, e.g., PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, No.
124, COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" LITIGATION 277 (1978); NAACP Brief,
supra note 62, at 6; see also Oversight of Certain Activities of the Legal Sepvices Corporation, Focus-
ing on Policies at the Corporation and Political Activities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. oil
Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1 st Sess. 2, 505 app. (1983) (Opening Statement
of Senator Hatch; Appendix II, Legal Fee Awards For Legal Services Corporation
Grantees) (total fee awards to Legal Services Corp. grantees amounted to 0.9% of
budget in 1981 and 1.8% in 1982); cf. Brief of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law as Amicus Curiae at 2, White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec.,
445 U.S. 455 (1982) (section 1988 is "becoming a significant income source for the
Lawyers' Committee").
104. In contrast, the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision, which prevented federal
courts from awarding attorney's fees in any civil rights cases, see 421 U.S. at 271, had an
immediate and substantial impact on the civil rights bar. See, e.g, H.R. REP. No. 1558.
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seeking only monetary damages, simultaneous negotiation will not
significantly reduce attorneys' compensation. Defendants' settle-
ment offers will consist of lump sums to be divided between plain-
tiffs and their lawyers as they or the court determine. 0 5 Since the
plaintiff's attorney's fee will be paid solely out of the plaintiff's
award, rather than as a separate payment by the defendant, plaintiffs
will obviously demand larger sums in settlement of their claims.
This will not be a deterrent to settlement, however. As defendants
will not remain liable for any further fees after settling the merits,
they will be able to increase the size of their offers accordingly.'
0 6
In suits asking for both equitable relief and monetary damages, or
in suits for equitable relief only, fee waivers may have more of an
effect. Even in these cases, though, the ultimate impact should be
minimal. First of all, not all defendants will make settlement offers
that are satisfactory on the merits; in these situations a trial will still
be necessary, and the court will award fees to prevailing plaintiffs as
always. Similarly, some plaintiffs will refuse fee waiver settlement
offers even if they contain satisfactory relief for themselves, perhaps
out of a sense of loyalty to their attorney or his or her organization,
or perhaps out of a desire to punish the defendants to the fullest
extent of the law. Although members of the private civil rights bar
may become less interested in taking these cases since their chances
of earning fees are reduced, this group of lawyers has never been a
supra note 11, at 3 (after Alyeska, private attorneys refused to take certain types of civil
rights cases).
105. Of course, the amount of the attorney's fee is also subject to the constraints of
the ethics codes, which require that the fee be reasonable. RVLES, supra note 27, Rule
1.5; CODE, supra note 26, DR 2-106; see also Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973) (court has inherent power to review terms of
contingent fee agreements).
106. If anything, the total recovery to plaintiffs and their attorneys should increase in
this situation. When they were forced to settle the merits before discussing fees, defend-
ants had to include a substantial cushion between their offer on the merits and the total
amount they were willing to pay in settling the case, in order to leave room for their
unknown attorney's fee liability. If we assume that defendants are risk-averse - a rea-
sonable assumption for defendants who are interested in settling, since risk avoidance is
a primary reason for settlement - the optimizing defendant would tend to offer a merits
settlement which, when added to the expected amount of attorney's fees to be assessed,
would be less than the total offer defendant would be willing to make in settling both
merits and fees simultaneously. This is so because the risky component of the bifur-
cated settlement, i.e., the estimated value of the unknown fee award, must be increased
by an amount reflecting the defendant's aversion to risk. Settling fees and merits simul-
taneously eliminates the understandable tendency of risk-averse defendants to overesti-
mate the necessary "cushion" for future attorney's fees awards, thus helping to ensure




significant presence in this type of case. 10 7 In any event, legal aid
and public interest organizations, with their alternative sources of
funding, will continue to litigate these cases.
It is important to note that although many, if not most, jurisdic-
tions have permitted fee waivers for a considerable period of time,
no deleterious impact on civil rights enforcement is discernible.' 08
Simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits in civil rights cases is
simply not a major threat to the vindication of civil rights. Condi-
tional settlement offers may actually enhance the ability of the judi-
cial system to handle fairly and efficiently the large number of civil
rights cases which it faces each year.' 0 9 As has been demonstrated
above, early settlement of many cases will be encouraged by use of
the simultaneous negotiation method. 1 0 Moreover, the Prandini
rule may have created more problems for both sides than it solved.
Since many defendants absolutely refused to settle without knowing
their exposure for attorney's fees, simultaneous negotiation did in
fact occur frequently; the parties were simply forced to negotiate
behind the court's back."' Even members of the civil rights plain-
tiffs' bar have acknowledged that a complete prohibition on fee ne-
gotiation is unworkable." 12 Permitting conditional fee waivers thus
fulfills the mandate of the ethics codes without significantly weaken-
ing civil rights enforcement, and at the same time eliminates the
need for the unseemly secret fee negotiations which were the neces-
sary byproduct of the Prandini rule.
107. See, e.g., Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281, 313-15 (1977); Kraus, supra note 25, at 633-34 ("private civil rights practi-
tioners are few in number").
108. See cases cited supra notes 20-2 1; see also supra note 36. E. Richard Larson, for-
mer national staff counsel for the ACLU, estimated in 1982 that fee waivers were re-
quested in more than half of all civil rights cases. See Winter, Fee Waiver Requests
Unethical: Bar Opinion, 68 A.B.A.J. 23 (1982).
109. In the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1986, 17,872 private civil rights
actions were filed in federal district court, and 18,205 such cases were terminated. 1986
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36, Tables C3, C4. The United States Courts of Appeals
disposed of 3,406 appeals in private civil rights cases during the same period. Id., Table
BIA.
110. See supra note 35. There is a clear judicial policy favoring settlement of cases
over trials. See, e.g., Evans v.JeffD., 106 S. Ct. at 1540-4 1; Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d
1204, 1209 (5th Cir. Unit A), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982). This policy is particularly
strong in the area of attorney's fee litigation; as one study observed, -[o]ne can hardly
conceive of a less socially valuable use of resources than fees litigation." NAAG Report,
supra note 81, at 3; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
111. See Third Circuit Report, supra note 102, at 41, 108 F.R.D. at 267; El Club del
Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corps., Inc., 735 F.2d 98, 101 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Prandini may be ... more honored in the breach.").
112. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 71, at 13-14.
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Conclusion
That opposing counsel in civil rights cases are now ethically obli-
gated to negotiate fees and merits simultaneously does not present
an insurmountable ethical dilemma for the attorneys involved, nor
does it significantly threaten the future enforcement of civil rights in
this country. It may even be beneficial to some degree. But in any
case, so long as the ethical standards governing the practice of law
require each attorney to further his or her client's interests within
the constraints of the adversary system, simultaneous negotiation of
fees and merits in civil rights cases will be an ethical and practical
necessity.
